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Abstract 
 
For participants in defined contribution (DC) plans who refrain from exercising investment choice, plan 
contributions are invested following the default investment option of their respective plans. Since default 
investment options of different plans vary widely in terms of their benchmark asset allocation, the most important 
determinant of investment performance, participants enrolled in these options face significantly different wealth 
outcomes at retirement. This paper simulates the terminal wealth outcomes under different static asset allocation 
strategies to evaluate their relative appeal as default investment choice in DC plans. We find that strategies with 
moderate allocation to stocks are consistently outperformed in terms of upside potential of exceeding the 
participant’s wealth accumulation target at retirement as well as downside risk of falling below that target 
outcome by very aggressive strategies whose allocation to stocks approach 100%. The risk of extremely adverse 
wealth outcomes for plan participants also does not appear to be very sensitive to asset allocation. Our evidence 
strongly suggests the appropriateness of strategies heavily tilted towards stocks to be nominated as default 
investment options in DC plans unless plan providers emphasize predictability of wealth outcomes over adequacy 
of retirement wealth. 
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IN MOST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, THE COINCIDENCE of a rapidly aging population with a rising proportion 
of retirees is placing considerable pressure on current social security programs.  This demographic trend 
has resulted in the benefits from social security becoming less certain for future retirees, unless there is a 
sharp increase in productivity.  The situation has prompted policymakers to encourage funded private 
retirement plans (generally sponsored by employers or other private providers) known as defined 
contribution (DC) plans, where employee participants build up retirement savings through mandatory or 
voluntary contributions in their individual retirement accounts.  Retirement benefits of participants in 
these plans are entirely dependent on the accumulation of plan contributions and investment returns 
earned on those assets.  A growing trend in DC plans is to give the individual participants more control 
over investment of their plan assets.  For instance, DC plan participants are expected to select an 
investment option from a menu of investment choices provided by the plan sponsor.  This investment 
decision is critical because it determines future investment returns on their plan assets, and therefore, 
influences the wealth accumulated in the retirement account at the end of the participant’s working life. 
 
A substantial body of recent research demonstrates that although members of retirement plans have the 
option to exercise choice, most accept the default arrangements in the plans.  The work of Choi, 
Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2003) finds that American employees tend to accept default 
arrangements in their plans for critical features like contribution rate and investment choice.  In their 
study, up to 80 per cent of assets in different plans are invested in the default fund.  In a recent study 
conducted by Beshears, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2006), around 9 out of 10 existing employees who 
were subject to automatic enrolment in the company retirement plan were found to have some of their 
assets invested in default fund, with around two-thirds having all their assets in the default fund.   
 
The apparent reluctance of the plan participants to exercise active investment choice is corroborated by 
international evidence.  According to consulting firm Hewitt Bacon and Woodrow, around 80 per cent 
of group personal pension scheme members in UK accept the default option provided by their plans 
(Bridgeland, 2002).  Similarly, Cronqvist and Thaler (2004) find that since 2003 only 10% of the new 
participants in Swedish retirement plans actually made any choice.  In Australia, about two-thirds of all 
retirement plan assets are invested in default investment options (Australian Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (APRA), 2005).  It seems that for a large majority of DC plan participants worldwide, the 
investment of plan contributions are dictated by the default arrangement of their respective plans. 
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Whether the failure of participants to exercise choice can be attributed to perceived lack of investment 
knowledge, inadequacy of the choices offered, or anomalies in human behaviour is a topic that has been 
widely researched and debated in recent times.  But given that most plan participants tend to accept 
default investment options in their plans, perhaps it is more important, from a practical standpoint, to 
question whether these default investment options are appropriately designed to meet the retirement 
goals of the participants.  This issue has received little research interest, which is surprising because 
financial well being for majority of plan participants after retirement is directly linked to the 
performance of the default options.  Moreover, international evidence like Blake, Byrne, Cairns, and 
Dowd (2004) indicates that there is serious lack of agreement on this subject which is reflected in the 
wide disparity in benchmark asset allocation of default funds chosen by different plan providers.   
 
The question of appropriateness of the default options is no less pertinent for countries where these are 
less heterogeneous in terms of strategic asset allocation.  For instance, Utkus (2004) points out that 
majority of the plans in the United States (US) choose a money market or stable value fund as default 
investment option although and that such arrangements are inconsistent with two of the ‘prudent 
investor’ principles on asset allocation underlying most participant education programs: first, the 
existence of positive equity risk premium; and, secondly, the change in the investor’s risk-taking 
capacity with age.1
 
In this paper, we examine the appropriateness of various asset allocation strategies adopted by DC plans 
in Australia as default options.  The importance of asset allocation in influencing investment 
performance has been well demonstrated by many researchers (Brinson, Hood, and Beebower, 1986; 
Blake, Lehmann, and Timmermann, 1999).  Therefore, one would expect that the asset allocation 
strategies of default options are decided with utmost care - not only because a majority of participants 
passively accept the default options offered by their plans - but also considering that there is evidence 
(Beshears et al., 2006) to suggest that many individuals perceive the default choice as recommendation 
or endorsement of a particular course of action by the provider.  This implies that once the participants 
get enrolled in the default option in their plans, they are also likely to persist with it for much of their 
working lives.  Given the very long horizon of retirement plan investments, a sub-optimal default asset 
allocation strategy runs enormous risk for the participants.  A mistake committed at the outset is unlikely 
                                                 
1 Utkus (2004) also observes that extant legal provisions permit investments that result in short-term losses to pursue long term gains and 
do not require the trustees to invest in ‘safe’ assets. 
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to be reversed at a later date and the compounding effect over the long horizon can lead to adverse 
outcomes, even potentially ruinous in some cases. 
 
To investigate the issue of appropriateness of asset allocation strategies used as default investment 
vehicles, we find Australian DC plans provide an interesting avenue for research for three reasons.  
First, Australia has a well established private retirement system with nine out of ten employees currently 
members of DC plans (APRA, 2005).  Since 1992, the Australian Government has made it compulsory 
for all employers to make contributions to these plans (known as ‘superannuation funds’) on behalf of 
their employees (members) at a minimum specified rate (currently nine per cent of wage and salary).2  
Since the post-retirement lifestyle of almost the entire workforce is heavily tied to the value of assets 
accumulated in their superannuation fund accounts, one would expect the plan providers to design 
investment strategies, particularly the default strategy, with utmost care.  This is also important because 
contribution rates being equal, the differences in the accumulated value of the plan assets for a vast 
majority of the members with similar earnings profile is largely reliant on the investment returns 
generated by the default investment strategy, which in turn is heavily influenced by its benchmark asset 
allocation. 
 
Second, members in Australian superannuation funds directly confront the classical portfolio choice 
problem as they are expected to choose an asset allocation strategy (or a combination of strategies) from 
a menu of pre-selected asset allocation strategies provided by the plan providers to invest plan 
contributions.  This is different from say 401 (k) plans in USA where participants are offered a choice of 
mutual funds rather than actual asset classes.  The default investment choice of every Australian 
superannuation fund clearly specifies the target allocation among available asset classes; there is no 
scope for the researcher to make any conjecture about the precise classification of mutual funds and 
commit any error in the process. 
 
Finally, to examine the issue of effectiveness of any strategic asset allocation policy in the context of 
wealth accumulation in DC plans, we need to consider its optimality from the perspective of an investor 
with long horizon, typically equalling the participant's employment life.  Many plans like 401 (k) may 
allow distribution of account balances for participants who change jobs as well as include loan features 
against account balances, the investment horizon relevant to many participants may actually be much 
                                                 
2 Many employees are employed under awards that require them to contribute an additional three per cent of wage to superannuation. 
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shorter.  Superannuation funds in Australia, on the other hand, are prohibited from permitting 
withdrawal of superannuation assets by members before they reach the preservation age (currently 60 
years for those born after June 1964).3  These funds also do not offer any loan feature to members 
against balance in their individual superannuation accounts.  Therefore, the asset allocation structure of 
the default options offered by Australian pension funds can be expected to be designed from a truly long 
term perspective and less concerned with the impact of short term volatility in returns on the 
participant's account balance. 
 
Past research on DC plan investment choices have mostly examined hypothetical asset allocation 
strategies.  In contrast, our study considers asset allocation strategies which are actually used by plan 
providers as default investment choices.  We use more than a hundred years of data for real returns on 
different asset classes to simulate the retirement wealth outcomes for a typical participant whose plan 
contributions are invested following the default asset allocation strategies of the top rated 
superannuation funds in Australia.  For the benefit of analysis, we also simulate wealth outcomes under 
two hypothetical allocation strategies: (i) 100% stocks; and, (ii) default option average (DOA) strategy.  
The outcomes are then compared to assess their relative appeal to be nominated as default investment 
option in DC plans.  To capture the possibility that past returns on any asset class may not represent the 
complete range of its expected future returns, we use both parametric and non-parametric methods in 
this paper to generate simulated returns for the asset classes. 
 
Poterba, Rauh, Venti, and Wise (2006) attempt to rank wealth outcomes associated with different asset 
allocation strategies for 401(k) plans by using utility function of retirement wealth.  However, we use 
risk-adjusted performance measures in lieu of utility-based framework to avoid making specific 
assumption about the form of the utility function of DC plan participants.  Also, in contrast to most other 
studies, we consider downside risk (the risk of the participants falling short of reaching their target 
wealth accumulation at retirement) as an important criterion in selecting an appropriate default strategy 
for DC plans.   
 
To evaluate alternative allocation rules in terms of their ability to meet the wealth accumulation 
objective of the plan participants, we employ lower partial moments as robust measures of downside risk 
and performance measures which are adjusted for downside risk.  This paper also considers the 
                                                 
3 Restricted withdrawals are permitted in some extreme circumstances. 
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possibility that the risk of extreme events can influence the plan providers’ choice of default strategy.  
We compare these risk estimates under each asset allocation strategy to rank them in terms of their 
ability to reduce the potential and severity of the most adverse outcomes.  Finally, we measure 
variability of outcomes for every strategy under consideration and compare these estimates as this can 
form the basis for selection of default in case plans aim to reduce the disparity in wealth outcomes 
between different employee cohorts. 
 
Our study reports several key findings.  First, asset allocation strategies with higher allocation to stocks 
can be expected to result in higher wealth outcomes for participants.  At the same time, the range of 
wealth outcomes generated by such strategies can also be expected to be wider.  Second, the downside 
risk of falling short of the participant’s target wealth outcome gets reduced with increased allocation to 
stocks in terms of probability as well as magnitude of shortfall.  This holds for participants with different 
levels of risk tolerance.  Our results also indicate that on most occasions a strategy which invests entirely 
in stocks offers highest upside potential and lowest downside risk in relation to retirement wealth 
accumulated by participants.  Third, contrary to popular belief, we find that the potential and severity of 
the most extreme outcomes for DC plan participants do not seem to increase much with increasing 
allocation to stocks.  In fact, there is little evidence that the extreme downside or tail-related risks of DC 
plan outcomes are sensitive to the choice of asset allocation strategies.  Finally, the lifecycle strategies 
which are currently used as defaults by a few Australian plans seem to impart little or no protection to 
participants from downside risk.  On the other hand, these strategies are found to considerably erode the 
value of retirement wealth the participants can potentially accumulate by keeping the initial asset 
allocation unchanged till retirement.  Therefore, like Booth and Yakoubov (2000), we find little basis for 
plans switching assets as participants approach retirement.4   
 
Our findings, although based on simulated wealth outcomes using historical return data for Australian 
asset classes, may have important implications for default investment options for retirement plans in 
other industrialised nations.  This is because the returns on various asset classes in many of these 
markets have displayed broadly similar trend over the last century (Dimson, Staunton, and Marsh, 
2002). 
 
Turning specifically to the issue of investment horizon, for college and university endowment funds, 
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who traditionally hold a 60:40 mix of stocks and bonds, Thaler and Williamson (1994) demonstrate that 
an allocation entirely to stocks is likely to provide superior results most of the time.  Although individual 
retirement accounts under DC plans do not have a quasi-infinite investment horizon as enjoyed by 
university endowment funds, it appears that the typical DC plan participant’s holding period of 30 to 40 
years may be considered sufficiently long to warrant more aggressive allocation than what is currently 
chosen by most plan sponsors for their default investment options.  Like Poterba et. al. (2006) we find 
that 100% allocation of stocks is optimal for DC retirement investors but we do not find this optimal 
allocation rule to change with the degree of risk aversion of the plan participant, especially when we 
consider performance adjusted for downside risk.  Even when the participants demonstrate unreasonably 
high degree of risk aversion like when they care only about the worst 5 per cent outcomes, the case for 
plan providers nominating a conservative or balanced strategy as default option does not appear to be 
strong. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the metrics used to evaluate 
different asset allocation strategies.  Section II describes the simulation methodology and model used to 
estimate terminal wealth outcomes at the point of retirement.  Section III describes the data.  Section IV 
discusses the simulation results, with Section V draws providing concluding comments. 
 
I. Metrics for Evaluating Retirement Wealth Outcomes 
 
To evaluate asset allocation strategies and assess their appropriateness as default investment options in 
DC plans, we need to make plausible assumptions about the rationale that may guide the selection of a 
specific asset allocation strategy as default option from many competing candidates.  The basic 
motivation behind instituting retirement savings plans, unarguably, is to generate adequate income for 
the participating employees after retirement.  In that case, performance of DC plans should be measured 
in terms of their ability to generate sufficient retirement income (Baker, Logue, and Rader, 2005).  
Therefore, it is assumed that that the principal investment objective of such plans is to maximize the 
terminal value of plan assets at the point of retirement since that would directly determine the amount of 
annuity the retiring employees are able to purchase for sustenance during post-retirement life.  Past 
studies have mainly considered the absolute value of the participant’s accumulated assets at retirement.  
However, we employ a ratio which compares the terminal wealth of the participant’s retirement account 
                                                                                                                                                                         
4 We desist from drawing any general conclusion on lifecycle strategies since we have very few funds in our sample using such strategies 
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to their terminal income because it is very likely that the participant’s post-retirement income 
expectations are closely linked to their immediate income before retirement.5  We call this measure the 
‘retirement wealth ratio’ (RWR).  To evaluate asset allocation strategies on the basis of terminal wealth 
outcomes we consider the mean, the median, and the quartiles of the RWR distribution. 
 
Higher estimates of different measures of RWR outcomes do not automatically qualify a particular 
strategy to be selected as default option.  The trustees also need to consider the risk associated with 
investment of plan assets since participants would want a better exploitation of trade-off between risk 
and reward.  In finance, the optimal trade-off between reward and risk is generally determined through 
Markowitz’s (1952) mean-variance analysis.  Yet it can be shown that in presence of time-varying 
investment opportunities, predictable variation in expected equity risk premium, or mean reversion in 
stock returns, risk can be viewed differently by long-term investors than short-term investors (Campbell 
and Viciera (2002)).  They also point out that mean-variance model also do not allow for periodic 
rebalancing of portfolio which is essential for long-term investors to maintain their strategic asset 
allocation.  Finally, the use of variance as a measure of risk is questionable especially for long-term 
investors like DC plan participants.  McEnally (1985) shows that the appropriate measure for investment 
risk is the variability of the terminal wealth outcomes that arise by holding an asset for the intended 
investment horizon and not the variability of periodic returns of the asset around its average return.  This 
study uses measures of terminal wealth to compute risk (and reward) associated with different asset 
allocation strategies.  However, we consider shortfall below target outcome instead variability of 
terminal wealth outcomes as measure of risk. 
 
As previously discussed, we assume that the ultimate goal of the DC plan participants is to attain a 
specific amount of wealth in DC plan account in terms of their terminal income, which we call the target 
retirement wealth ratio .  Under this assumption, the investment risk most relevant to 
participants is that of failure of their chosen asset allocation strategy to generate .  This type of 
‘downside risk’ is not new to economics and finance literature.  Roy (1952) developed the target rate of 
return approach in a portfolio selection context where the investor is concerned about minimizing the 
probability of falling below the disaster level or minimum acceptable rate of return.  Mao (1970) 
)( TRWR
TRWR
                                                                                                                                                                         
and the mode of switching is also different from that of typical lifecycle funds in other countries. 
5 This is supported by Booth and Yakoubov (2000), who employ a similar benchmark, that is, the value of accumulated fund at retirement 
in terms of employee’s salary.  In addition, this study uses a broader range of metrics in evaluating the risk-reward characteristics of the 
outcomes. 
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presents evidence to show that decision makers conceive risk as the possibility of outcomes below 
target.  Olsen (1997) finds that two of the most important attributes of perceived investment risk are 
potential for below target returns and potential for large loss.  We capture these two risk attributes by 
employing downside risk and tail-related risk metrics respectively. 
 
In this paper, we employ the lower partial moment (Bawa, 1975; Fishburn, 1977) to measure downside 
risk of different asset allocation strategies.  As a risk measure lower partial moment (LPM) can 
accommodate different forms of known Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions unlike variance or 
semi-variance where investor’s utility function always needs to be quadratic.  LPM can represent 
different attitudes of pension fund members towards risk such as risk averse, risk seeking, and risk 
neutral.  In other words, with LPM there is no limitation on the value of the risk aversion coefficient 
used in investment analysis. 
 
If λ  denotes the risk tolerance of the plan participant, then lower partial moment of retirement wealth 
outcomes is given by: 
 
 
λ
λ ∑
=
−=
n
t
tT RWRRWRMaxn
LPM
1
)](,0[1  [1] 
 
where  is the target outcome, is the outcome for the t-th observation, n is the number of 
observed RWR outcomes, and Max is the maximization function that selects the larger between the 
numbers 0 and .  The term
TRWR tRWR
)( tT RWRRWR − λ , which is known as the degree of lower partial moment 
(LPM) can theoretically assume any value depending on the risk aversion of the participant. 
 
We compute the lower partial moments for wealth outcomes under different asset allocation strategies 
for participants with λ = 0, 1, and 2.  For λ  = 0,  gives the probability of shortfall, that is, how 
often the return can fall below the target although it does not consider how severe the shortfall is likely 
to be.  If 
0LPM
λ = 1,  weighs shortfalls (  less below  outcomes in the context of our 
problem) with linear weighting.  This is also defined as the expected shortfall of the strategy.  For
1LPM TRWR TRWR
λ = 2, 
 gives the below-target semi-variance.  Bawa (1975) shows that LPM is mathematically related to 
stochastic dominance when risk tolerance (
2LPM
λ ) is 0, 1 or 2.  The choice of appropriate shortfall measure 
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may be guided by the investor’s degree of risk aversion (Bawa 1978, Harlow and Rao, 1989) with risk-
averse investors choosing LPM with λ  > 0. 
 
We also use performance measures which are adjusted for downside risk in evaluating alternative asset 
allocation strategies.  The concept of downside deviation has been used to suggest several risk-adjusted 
performance measures, the most well-known among which is the Sortino ratio (SR) introduced by 
Sortino and Price (1994).  This is given by: 
 
 SR 
2
1
2 ][LPM
RWRRWR TM −=  [2] 
 
where:  denotes the mean RWR. The denominator in (2) denotes the downside deviation of wealth 
outcomes.  Due to this formulation, it does not penalise performance for volatility above the investor's 
target unlike the Sharpe ratio. 
MRWR
 
Recent research in behavioural finance suggests contrary to the prescriptions of the portfolio theory, 
individuals may not be seeking the highest return for a given level of risk.  Statman and Shefrin (2000) 
claim that investors seek upside potential from investments while protecting the downside.  According 
to the normative utility function of Fishburn (1977), individuals are risk averse below a minimum 
acceptable rate of return and risk neutral above it.  Sortino, van der Meer, and Plantinga (1999) propose 
a performance statistic that accommodates the above suggestions by replacing the excess of mean above 
target in Sortino ratio with the upside potential of the investment, a probability weighted summation of 
all outcomes which are above the target.  This gives the upside potential ratio (UPR) which measures the 
upside potential relative to the downside risk.  In the context of our problem: 
 
 
( )
[ ] 212LPM
RWRRWR
UPR TRWR
T∑∞ −
=  [3] 
 
Next, we consider the risk of extremely adverse wealth outcomes for plan participants.  The 
psychological concept of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) is 
increasingly used in economic analysis.  Many authors have suggested that considerations of ruinous 
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loss would affect decisions involving uncertainty (Laughhunn, Payne, and Crum, 1980).  Rabin and 
Thaler (2001) show that reasonable degrees of risk aversion for small and moderate stakes imply 
unreasonable high degrees of risk aversion for large stakes.  If DC plan participants are believed to be 
loss averse towards the value of their retirement assets, which can be considered as a ‘large stake’, the 
plan sponsors may decide to select asset allocation strategies that have more chance of avoiding the most 
disastrous outcomes.  In other words, DC plans would select strategies that lower the estimates of tail 
risk of the probability distribution of retirement wealth as their default investment option. 
 
To evaluate the extreme retirement wealth outcomes of alternative asset allocation strategies, we use two 
common measures of estimating tail risk - value at risk (VaR) and expected tail loss (ETL).  The use of 
VaR in risk management is widespread (Jorion, 2000). In the context of our problem, if p represents the 
probability of worst percentage of RWR outcomes that the participants are concerned about,α is the 
confidence level and p is set such that α−= 1p , and if represents the p-quantile of the RWR 
distribution, then the VaR at that confidence level is given by: 
pQ
 pQVaR =  [4] 
An outcome worse than VaR can occur only in extreme circumstances, the probability of which can be 
specified by the user by specifyingα , which indicates the likelihood that the investor would not get an 
outcome worse than VaR.  The higher the degree of risk aversion, higher is the value of α  and vice 
versa.  
 
Yet it has been demonstrated that VaR at a given probability gives us no idea about the amount at risk at 
higher or lower levels of probability (Balzer, 1994).  It also suffers from lack of sub-additive feature and 
therefore cannot fulfil a necessary axiom of being qualified as a coherent risk measure (Artzner, 
Delbaen, Eber, and Heath, 1999) . Expected Tail Loss (ETL), which is often forwarded as a better 
candidate in this regard (Yoshiba and Yamai (2002), Dowd, 2005), gives the probability weighted 
average of estimates that fall below VaR.  In our case, if  is the i th outcome and i is the 
probability of the i th outcome, then: 
iRWR
 
 iRWRETL
i
i .1
1
0
∑
=−=
α
α α  [5]  
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Therefore, in the context of wealth accumulation of participants, ETL is actually the average of the 
worst 100(1- α ) % of the RWR outcomes. 
 
Finally, employee participants belonging to the same plan and following an identical investment strategy 
but retiring a few years apart can face widely different wealth outcomes (Burtless, 2003).  Plan providers 
may feel that it is important to minimize the disparity in real retirement wealth among different 
employee cohorts whose investments are governed by the same default strategy.6  In that case, they 
would be prompted to select such an asset allocation strategy as default which results in least variation 
in real retirement wealth outcomes between different employee cohorts, in other words, the real 
retirement wealth outcomes under different investment return scenarios fall within a narrow range.  Our 
simulations produce a range of possible RWR outcomes for every strategy.  The terminal wealth 
outcome in every case is dependent on the simulated path for asset class returns.  Which of these return 
paths would actually govern the investments of participants following a specific strategy would entirely 
depend on the future state of the world.  The future return path, however, would be identical for 
participants belonging to the same cohort while it is likely to be different for participants belonging to 
different cohorts.7  Therefore participants from different cohorts may have different terminal wealth 
outcomes even when their investments are directed by identical default option.   
 
To compare the variability of retirement wealth outcomes under different asset allocation strategies, we 
use two common measures of dispersion.  First, we estimate coefficient of variation (CV) for simulated 
retirement wealth outcomes under every strategy which is the standard deviation of RWR outcomes 
divided by the mean RWR.  To supplement this metric, we also estimate the inter-quartile range ratio 
(IQRR) which is obtained by dividing the difference between the 75th percentile RWR and the 25th 
percentile RWR by the median RWR for each strategy under consideration. 
 
II. Model for Generating Retirement Wealth Outcomes 
 
To analyse the wealth outcomes generated by different asset allocation strategies, we use a simple DC 
plan accumulation model which uses stochastic simulation of asset class returns to determine the 
                                                 
6 Cross-cohort differences in retirement preparedness as a result of variation in wealth accumulated through retirement plans may also not 
be desirable from a policy perspective. 
7 It is easy to see that parts of the return paths experienced by different cohorts would be overlapping for the cohorts who share overlapping 
employment periods. 
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expected distribution of wealth outcome at retirement.  As discussed in previous section, the wealth 
outcome is measured as retirement wealth ratio (RWR).  The terminal value of DC plan assets is given 
by: 
 
  [5] ∏∑ −
+=
−
=
++−=
1
1
1
0
)1()1()1(
R
tu
ut
R
t
tt rrSpkW
 
where: W = value of plan assets accumulated at the point of retirement 
  = Plan contribution rate k
  = Probability of unemployment in year t tp  
  = Annual salary in year t tS
  = Real rate of investment return earned in year t tr
 R  = Number of years in the plan before retirement 
 
To estimate W, we need to model the: (i) contribution cash flows; and, (ii) investment returns for each 
period.  The contribution cash flows depend on annual salary, contribution rate, and probability of 
unemployment in any period.  The annual salary for any year depends on starting wage, wage growth 
rate, and the number of years elapsed since commencing employment.  This is given by: 
 
  [7] 10 )1(
−+= tt gSS
 
where  is the starting wage of the plan participant and is the real wage growth rate. Investment 
returns are dependent on returns on individual asset classes (included in the portfolio) and the weights 
assigned to them.  The latter is determined by the asset allocation strategy of the plan.  Mathematically: 
0S g
 
  [8] ∑= titit rwr ,,
where:   is the weight assigned to the  asset in year t and   is the real return on the asset in 
year t 
tiw ,
thi tir ,
thi
 
We base our analysis on simulated wealth outcomes for an employee who joins the plan at the age of 25 
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years and retires at the age of 65 years.  The starting salary of the employee is assumed to be 25,000 
Australian Dollars and the growth in real wages to be two per cent per year, which closely follows 
growth rate of Australia's real GDP per capita of 2.6 per cent per annum from 1994 through 2004 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2005).  The contribution rate is fixed at nine per cent which is the 
legislated minimum prescribed by the Australian government.  No contribution is made during periods 
of unemployment, the probability of which is assumed to be five per cent.  This is equal to the 
unemployment rate among Australian workers with post-school qualifications (Kryger, 1999; 
Richardson, 2006).  For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the contributions are credited annually to 
the accumulation fund at the end of every year (in practice, the Australian Government has recently 
legislated that contributions needs to be made, at a minimum, on a quarterly basis).  The portfolios are 
also rebalanced at the end of each year to maintain the target asset allocation.  We assume that plan 
contributions and investment returns are not subject to any tax.  We also ignore any transaction cost that 
may be incurred in managing the investment of the plan assets. 
 
For generating asset class returns, this study initially employs Monte Carlo simulation which estimates 
statistical parameters from historical data series under assumed theoretical distribution and then exposes 
these to random changes in simulating future outcomes. Following standard Monte Carlo simulation 
methodology, we assume that asset class returns are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution.  This 
implies that mean and standard deviation of asset class returns are time invariant and the returns are 
independent over the time horizon.  At each stage of the simulation horizon, the random shocks 
generated by the multivariate normal model are adjusted so as to follow the average cross-sectional 
correlation observed in the historical data. 
 
Since Monte Carlo simulation imposes explicit distributional assumption in generating asset class 
returns, we run a parallel test for generating wealth outcomes using non-parametric bootstrapping which 
draws asset class returns from the empirical return distribution. Here the historical return data series for 
the asset classes is randomly resampled with replacement to generate portfolio returns for every period 
of the 40 year investment horizon of the DC plan participant. In other words, each bootstrap sample is a 
random sample of asset class returns for a particular period drawn with replacement from historical 
observations over several periods. Thus we retain the cross-correlation between the asset class returns as 
given by the historical data while assuming that asset class return series is independently distributed 
over time.    
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 III. Data 
 
To investigate the issue of strategic asset allocation for long horizon investors like DC plan participants 
it is essential that we generate simulated returns based on historical observations of asset class returns 
over several decades.  This is done to minimize the undue influence that recent investment performances 
(of these asset classes) may have on long-term risk assessment and asset allocation decisions. Moreover, 
it is argues that a longer period of data has greater chance of capturing the wide-ranging effects of 
favourable and unfavourable events of history on returns of individual asset classes.  Since participants 
are likely to be concerned with the effect of inflation on the value of their retirement wealth, we need to 
use real investment returns to simulate terminal wealth outcomes for different asset allocation strategies.  
This paper uses an updated version of the dataset of returns on stocks, bonds, and bills originally 
compiled by Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002) and commercially available through Ibbotson 
Associates for 16 countries including Australia for a period of 105 years spanning from 1900 to 2004.  
All returns are annual real returns and include reinvested income and capital gains. 
 
For the full 105 year period from 1900 to 2004, the mean annual real return for Australian stocks has 
been 9.09 per cent while the same for Australian bonds and bills has been 2.27 per cent and 0.72 per 
cent respectively.  When we consider only data after the Second World War, from 1947 through 2004, 
the mean annual real returns for the three asset classes were smaller, recorded at 8.05, 1.08, and 0.62 per 
cent for stocks, bonds, and bills respectively.  However, real returns for all three classes seem to have 
been significantly higher in recent times.  During the most recent 30 year period in our dataset, 1975 
through 2004, mean annual real returns for stocks, bonds, and bills have been 10.93, 4.97, and 3.20 per 
cent respectively.  Going by the higher mean real returns produced by stocks, one would also expect 
much higher standard deviation for stocks in comparison to that for bonds and bills.  This has exactly 
been the case with the standard deviation of annual real returns on stocks, bonds, and bills being 17.74, 
13.36, and 5.51 per cent from 1900 through 2004.  The corresponding estimates for post war period 
(1947-2004) were 21.06, 11.47, and 5.09 per cent while those most recent 30-year period (1975-2004) 
were 20.54, 11.13, and 3.76 per cent. 
 
Since DC plan participants have long investment horizons, typically between 30 and 40 years, asset 
class returns for long holding periods would be of more interest in examining their case.  From asset 
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class return data between 1900 through 2004, we find that the real returns from bonds have been 
negative for 29 of the 76 observed 30 year holding periods and 20 out of 66 observed 40-year holding 
periods.  Bills recorded further underperformance with 32 of the 76 observed 30-year holding periods 
and 20 of the 66 observed 40-year holding periods yielding negative real returns for the investors.  In 
contrast, the real returns from Australian stocks for every 30-year and 40-year holding periods between 
1900 and 2004 were positive.  The real equity premium over bond and bills has also been positive for 
each of these holding periods. 
 
We also use data on default investment strategy for major Australian superannuation funds.  In 
Australia, it is a regulatory requirement for trustees to identify a default strategy where investment 
choice is offered to standard employer-sponsored members.  Most superannuation funds offer a balanced 
diversified investment strategy to their member participants as the default investment choice.  The 
guidelines for trustees provided by the regulatory authority emphasises the benefits of diversification as, 
according to them, it would ‘result in a lower overall level of risk to achieve desired return’ (APRA, 
1999).  At the end of June 2004, the majority of default strategy assets of superannuation funds were 
held in stocks: 33 per cent in Australian stocks and 21 per cent in international stocks.  A further 15 per 
cent was invested in Australian fixed interest, 6 per cent in international fixed interest, 7 per cent in 
cash, 6 per cent in property, and 12 per cent in other assets (APRA, 2005). 
 
In 2005-06, SuperRatings, an independent research house, conducted a comprehensive analysis of 120 
superannuation funds including major industry, corporate, and public sector funds as well as commercial 
master trusts, most of which hold more than $500 million of assets.8 Together, the funds cover in excess 
of $300 billion of retirement savings on behalf of nearly 10 million member accounts.  The funds are 
rated on the basis of their performance by aggregating several factors including investment 
methodology, returns, fees, administration and governance/risk framework.  A total of seventeen of 
these funds (representing the top 15 per cent of their universe) received the highest or ‘platinum’ rating.  
In this paper, we limit our study to these ‘platinum’ rated funds since most of these funds can be 
expected to have default investment strategies that are relatively well designed compared to those of 
funds with lower ratings.  The asset allocation data for individual default investment strategies is 
collected from the product disclosure statements available in the respective websites of these funds as on 
March 2006.   
                                                 
8 More details of the survey and rankings are available on SuperRating’s website, www.superratings.com.au
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 Use of lifecycle funds as default options in DC plans has been gaining popularity in recent years 
(Feinberg, 2004).  However, most Australian superannuation funds continue to offer static fixed weight 
allocation strategies as investment options to members.  In our study, only three of the seventeen default 
investment options change their allocation with the age of the participant.  But unlike typical ‘target 
retirement funds’ in the US and elsewhere where the benchmark asset allocation is changed 
continuously and gradually to achieve a more conservative asset allocation as the members grow older 
and approach retirement, the change in asset allocation here is done instantaneously when the members 
reach specified age threshold(s).  For each of these three default options, we examine two different 
allocation rules: one assuming that their initial asset allocation remains unchanged till the retirement of 
the participant (which is equivalent to a fixed weight strategy) and another following the exact switch in 
allocations given by the actual default option i.e. lifecycle strategy.  This enables us to directly compare 
the results and determine whether this type of lifecycle strategies can be expected to produce superior 
outcomes for the participants, particularly in terms of reducing risk.  In addition, we examine two 
hypothetical strategies: (i) default option average (DOA) strategy whose allocation is same as the 
average allocation of default options for all Australian superannuation funds as of June 2004; and, (ii) 
the 100 per cent stocks strategy. 
 
Initially we conduct our analysis under the assumption that the DC plan assets are invested in Australian 
stocks, bonds, and bills.  Allocations of the default options to international stocks and international 
bonds are, therefore, included in domestic stocks and bonds respectively.  We, later, repeat the 
simulations by including international stocks and international bonds as separate asset classes but do not 
present the results here since these lead to very similar conclusions.9  Although ‘property’ is an 
important asset class for investment by these funds, we do not include it as a separate asset class in our 
analysis because of the paucity of reliable long-term return data.  Similarly ‘alternative investments’ 
which mainly comprises of investments in infrastructure, hedge funds, and commodities, cannot be 
included because of the lack of specific information on their composition and therefore of any reliable 
index to measure returns.  While examining investment strategies of Australian superannuation funds, 
we handle their allocation component to ‘properties’ and ‘alternative investments’ in a manner similar to 
that of other well-known studies like Brinson et. al., (1986) and Arshanapalli, Coggin, and Nelson 
                                                 
9  This may be due to the reason that we use US stocks and US bonds, which are highly correlated with their Australian counterparts, as 
proxies for international stocks and international bonds. 
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(2001), where the percentage allotted to ‘others’ is divided between equities, bonds and bills on a pro-
rata basis.  However, we choose to direct the allocations against ‘property’ and ‘alternative investments’ 
only to equities and bonds (and not bills) on a pro-rata basis, because we believe that the risk-return 
profile of these asset classes is far removed from that of bills (cash).  The asset allocation data for every 
strategy included in our analysis are provided in Table I. 
 
[INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE] 
 
Out of the seventeen ‘platinum’ rated funds used in our analysis, eight funds have their default option’s 
initial allocation to stocks ranging between 60% and 70% which typically represents a balanced 
diversified fund.  The DOA strategy also has an asset allocation profile similar to these strategies.  Of 
the remaining funds, four funds have their default strategy’s initial allocation to stocks between 70% and 
80% while the default strategies of other five funds are highly aggressive with more than 80% of assets 
invested to stocks.  Only three of the default strategies (#18, #19, and #20) change their initial asset 
allocation with the age of the member.  To examine the efficacy of these lifecycle strategies, we devise 
three corresponding fixed weight strategies (#6, #7, and #16) by assuming that their initial asset 
allocations remain constant throughout the investment horizon.  Therefore, we have seventeen fixed 
weight strategies (fourteen actual and three devised), three lifecycle strategies, and two hypothetical 
strategies, that is, twenty-two strategies in total available for our analysis. 
 
IV. Simulation Experiments and Results 
 
Based on the wealth accumulation model described in Section II, we simulate RWR outcome for all the 
twenty-two asset allocation strategies.  We conduct two separate sets of simulation experiments using 
the Monte Carlo and bootstrap resampling methods for return generation respectively. For both sets of 
experiments, we conduct 5,000 iterations for every asset allocation strategy under consideration to 
generate 5,000 different investment return paths over 40-year periods.  These simulated returns are 
applied every year on corresponding cash flows in the participant’s account to produce a range of 5,000 
RWR outcomes under every strategy at the end of the 40-year horizon.  Each set of experiment is 
initially conducted based on historical asset class returns for the entire period of availability of data, 
1900 through 2004.  However, it is quite possible that structural changes in the domestic and the 
international economy may render data from very distant past, especially before the Second World War, 
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less relevant in projecting future asset class returns.  Therefore, we repeat the simulations using two 
more recent datasets: one for the entire post-war period (1947-2004) and another for the most recent 30 
year period (1975-2004).  Since the estimates obtained by the Monte Carlo and the bootstrap resampling 
experiments are very similar, we report only the results of the former in Tables II, III, and IV.10  
 
We set the wealth accumulation target  for the plan participant at 8.0 i.e. 800 per cent of salary at 
retirement.  Booth and Yakoubov (2000) uses a target wealth of 500 per cent of salary at retirement 
which translates into a of 5.0.  Although there is no consensus on what can be considered as an 
adequate wealth to income ratio for Australian retirees, we choose to set at a seemingly higher 
level for two reasons.  First, several commentators consider the current wealth to income levels as 
grossly inadequate in view of increasing life expectancy and growing health care costs.  Second, since 
our study ignores the taxes on retirement savings and investment returns as well as transaction costs 
while modelling terminal wealth outcomes, we feel the need to compensate it by setting the target 
wealth outcome on the higher side.  However, setting at a different value is not expected to alter 
the relative ranking of asset allocation strategies as long as we hold it constant for all the simulations. 
TRWR
TRWR
TRWR
TRWR
 
A. RWR Distribution 
 
The distribution of RWR for each asset allocation strategy provides us with the range of wealth 
outcomes the participant may expect to confront at the point of retirement.  In addition to mean and 
median RWR, we estimate the first and third quartile estimates of the distribution for every allocation 
strategy to assess their relative appeal.  For any of these parameters, a higher value would generally 
make a strategy more attractive.  Table II provides the distribution parameters of RWR for each of the 
asset allocation strategies.  The results indicate that RWR varies significantly across asset allocation 
strategies.  The mean and the median RWR seem to increase for strategies with higher allocation to 
stocks and are highest for the strategy which invests entirely in stocks.  The median RWR for the 100 
per cent stocks strategy is over 50 per cent higher than that of DOA strategy, which only has two-thirds 
of assets invested in stocks.  Although in a few cases, the mean and median RWR are not higher for the 
strategy with higher proportion of stocks, we find that the allocations to stocks in these cases are very 
close, and the difference in outcome seems to be more influenced by the difference in their allocation 
                                                 
10 Results of the bootstrap resampling experiments can be obtained by contacting the authors. 
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splits between bonds and cash. 
 
[INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE] 
 
The first and third quartile outcomes also tend to increase as we move from strategies with lower 
proportion of stocks to those with higher proportion of stocks.  The difference between first quartile 
outcomes of different strategies are relatively smaller compared to the spread between the third quartile 
outcomes.  For example, the first quartile outcomes for the strategy with the lowest and highest 
allocation to stocks are 5.70 and 7.48 respectively.  The corresponding estimates for their third quartile 
outcomes are 12.04 and 19.02.  Again, the 100 per cent stocks strategy results in the best first and third 
quartile RWR outcomes.  The increasing trend in RWR outcomes with aggressiveness of the asset 
allocation strategy is graphically demonstrated in Figure 1.  Generally more aggressive is the strategy, 
higher (lower) is the maximum (minimum) RWR outcome.  Also, the minimum outcomes for different 
strategies lie within a narrow range (0.57 to 1.13) which shows that there is not much to choose between 
the strategies on the basis of their worst outcomes. 
 
Figure 1. RWR distribution parameters for simulation using full period (1900-2004) data.  IQRR denotes 
the interquartile range ratio which is used as a measure of dispersion of RWR outcomes.  RWR 
distribution parameters for lifecycle strategies are not included since these have changing allocation to 
stocks over time. 
 
The results of Monte Carlo simulations using returns data for 1947-2004 and 1975-2004 give similar 
indications about the effect of asset allocation strategies on terminal wealth outcomes.  While the RWR 
estimates for various strategies vary when we use data for different periods, strategies with higher 
allocations to stocks consistently dominate those with lower allocation to stocks in terms of mean, 
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median, first quartile, and third quartile outcomes.  As before, the 100 per cent stocks strategy result in 
the best outcomes for all these parameters except the first quartile outcome for the simulations using 
1975-2004 data.  The best result, in this case, is produced by a strategy which invests 88 per cent of 
assets in stocks and remaining in bonds.    
 
Our simulations produce a range of possible RWR outcomes for every strategy.  It is important to 
measure the dispersion of RWR outcomes for each strategy in order to form a view on possible future 
retirement wealth disparity among different cohorts following that strategy.  The estimates for both CV 
and IQRR indicate that the dispersion of RWR outcomes tends to increase with increase in allocation to 
stocks although the rate of increase seems to be very small.  For instance, the IQRR for the strategy with 
lowest stock allocation (64%) is 0.7725 while that for the strategy with highest allocation to stocks 
(93%) is 0.9559.  The hypothetical 100 per cent stocks strategy produces an IQRR of 1.0631.  These 
estimates indicate that the disparity in wealth outcomes between the cohorts who meet very positive 
investment return scenarios and those who confront relatively unfavourable investment returns during 
their employment life while being enrolled in the same default option may be dependent on the 
allocation policy of the plan.  Nevertheless, the difference in disparity across cohorts for strategies with 
different proportions of stocks may no be very large.  This is well demonstrated by the flatness of the 
IQRR curve when plotted against strategies with changing allocation to stocks. The simulation results 
using data for recent periods also support these findings. 
 
By comparing the RWR distribution parameters of each of the lifecycle strategies (#18, #19, and #20) 
with those of the corresponding strategy that maintains its initial asset class weighting (#6, #7, and #16 
respectively), we find that former produces lower mean, median, first quartile, and third quartile 
outcomes in every case.  Yet the minimum outcome in almost all cases is slightly higher for the lifecycle 
strategies.11  Since the CV and IQRR are also always lower for lifecycle strategies, it seems that 
switching to a conservative allocation as the employee approaches retirement may actually reduce the 
dispersion in RWR outcomes.  In other words, if these strategies do not switch their asset allocation with 
the members approaching retirement, the range of expected wealth outcomes gets wider.   
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B. Downside Risk and Risk-Adjusted Performance Estimates 
 
We use lower partial moments with risk aversion parameters 0, 1, and 2 so that the investors with 
different levels of risk tolerance can use these estimates to evaluate alternative asset allocation 
strategies.  Table III reports the downside risk estimates for RWR under different asset allocation 
strategies.  
 
[INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Estimates for all the LPM measures steadily increase with decrease in allocation to stocks indicating a 
clear inverse relationship.  For instance, the for the strategy with 64 per cent allocation to stocks is 
0.4826 which indicates that there is a 48.26 per cent probability that the RWR would fall below  
(close to the toss of a fair coin).  In comparison, the probability of shortfall for the strategy with 77% 
stocks is 38.58 per cent and for the strategy with 93 per cent stocks is 28.06 per cent.  Interestingly, the 
100 per cent stocks strategy has only 26.22 per cent, or around one-in-four, probability of falling 
below  , which is the lowest of all strategies, while DOA strategy has almost 47 per cent chance of 
underperforming that target.   
0LPM
TRWR
TRWR
 
Similar trends are also observed for measures of magnitude of shortfall and below target 
semivariance  indicating that the downside risk actually gets reduced by of increasing allocation 
to stocks in the portfolio.  Figure 2 graphically depicts this trend.  The slopes of LPM curves reveal that 
the rate of decline of downside risk gets higher with increasing risk aversion, that is, more averse the 
participants are to the downside risk of failing to meet their wealth accumulation objective, more 
appealing would the aggressive strategies be relative to balanced or conservative strategies. 
)( 1LPM
)( 2LPM
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
11 However, the minimum outcome may not serve as a useful evaluation criterion because there is only a 1 in 5,000 chance of getting that 
outcome. 
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Figure 2. Downside risk estimates for simulation using full period (1900-2004) data.  Lower partial 
moments for RWR outcomes have been computed for three different degrees of risk aversion: 0, 1, and 
2.  is set at 8.0.  Lifecycle strategies are not included since these have changing allocation to 
stocks over time. 
TRWR
 
Simulation results using post-war data also suggest that LPM estimates are generally smaller for 
strategies with higher allocation to stocks.  However, the results are not as conclusive when we use 
recent 30-year returns data as simulation input.  While the estimates are still lower for more 
aggressive strategies, albeit by a much smaller margin, this is not true for  and .  The 
estimates for  do not exhibit any clear trend with similar estimates observed for strategies with 
significantly different proportion of stocks.  For , the estimates are generally lower for strategies 
holding lower proportion of stocks.  The evidence for lifecycle strategies also follows the same pattern.  
The simulation results using full period and post-war period data shows that the downside risk actually 
increases by making lifecycle switching whereas results with the recent 30-year returns data indicates 
mixed trends - estimates are higher (higher downside risk) while and estimates are 
lower (suggesting lower downside risk) for lifecycle strategies compared to corresponding strategies 
where the initial asset weightings remain unchanged. 
0LPM
1LPM 2LPM
1LPM
2LPM
0LPM 1LPM 2LPM
 
While the terminal wealth outcomes and associated risks involved with each allocation strategy under 
consideration can be assessed from the parameters of the simulated RWR distribution and various 
measures of LPM, composite performance measures are essential to rank the strategies based on overall 
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risk-reward profile.  We compute estimates for Sortino and UPR, performance measures that are 
adjusted for downside risk and also produce these results in Table III. For simulations using full period 
data, Sortino and UPR are generally found to increase with rising proportion of stocks in the strategy.  
This is almost always the case with strategies with more than 70% allocation to stocks.  The 100% stock 
strategy results in the highest Sortino and UPR.   
 
The above results come as no surprise since we earlier found strategies with higher stock allocation to be 
superior in terms of terminal wealth outcomes as well as downside risk based on our simulation with the 
full period data.  Of more interest is the performance estimates for simulations using data for the other 
two sub-periods because downside risk estimates in these cases lead to conclusions that were different 
from those of simulation with the full period data, particularly for  and . However, we find 
that the risk-adjusted performance estimates for the sub-periods are supportive of the rankings indicated 
by the full-period simulation.  Estimates for both Sortino and UPR in these cases indicate that an 
allocation rule dominated by stocks result in better risk adjusted performance and therefore, are 
consistent with the findings based on simulation using full period data.  Also, lifecycle strategies 
produce inferior risk-adjusted performance estimates in all cases compared to their fixed weight 
counterparts.  
1LPM 2LPM
 
C. Tail-Related Risk Estimates 
 
As discussed in Section I, it is plausible that plan participants may care more about the most adverse 
outcomes that can occur for a given strategy which makes it important to analyse the risk of these 
extreme events.  Plan providers in that case are likely to use ‘maxi-min’ rule to select a strategy which 
maximizes the worst ‘n’ percentile of outcomes.  In this paper, we estimate VaR and ETL at 95 per cent 
confidence level, which means we assume that the participants are concerned about the worst 5 per cent 
of RWR outcomes.  While it is theoretically possible that some participants may demonstrate an even 
greater degree of risk aversion, that is, they may only consider RWR outcomes that are below an even 
lower threshold (say 1 per cent), we believe that in reality the 5th percentile outcome would serve as an 
adequate indicator of extreme risk for majority of participants.  Moreover, for participants who are 
concerned about outcomes falling below 5th percentile, the ETL measure provides the expected value of 
such outcome. 
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The results for VaR and ETL estimates are produced in Table IV.  The results for simulations using full 
period data indicate that the VaR estimates, in general, tend to increase with aggressiveness of the asset 
allocation strategy although strategies with higher proportion of stocks do not always result in better 
outcome than a strategy with slightly lower proportion of stocks.  More importantly, it is observed that 
the difference among the VaR estimates of different asset allocation strategies is very small. 
 
[INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE] 
 
The lowest observed VaR estimate is 3.3936 given by the strategy with lowest allocation to stocks 
which means employing this by strategy there is a 5 per cent (or one-in-twenty) chance of the RWR 
falling below that level.  The highest VaR estimate (4.0033) is produced by the 100 per cent stock 
strategy which goes against the conventional logic that stocks, being most volatile among the asset 
classes, can potentially result in the most adverse outcomes.  The results for ETL also support these 
conclusions. 
 
 
Figure 3. Tail risk estimates of asset allocation strategies at 95 per cent confidence level for simulations 
using asset class returns data for full period (1900-2004), post-war period (1947-2004), and most recent 
30-year period (1975-2004).  Lifecycle strategies are not included since these have changing allocation 
to stocks over time. 
 
The simulation results based on data for other periods present a slightly different picture but do not alter 
the fundamental conclusion of the previous simulation.  Using data for 1947-2004 period, the VaR 
estimates of individual strategies are found to lie within a very close range (2.3603-2.6014) and do not 
seem to follow any clear pattern.  The 100 per cent stocks strategy produces a VaR estimate of 2.41 
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which is almost same as that of the strategy with the lowest stock allocation (64 per cent) but slightly 
lower than that of DOA strategy which has 67 per cent allocation to stocks and produces a VaR estimate 
of 2.5196.  Similarly, the ETL estimates are generally higher for the balanced strategies but only 
marginally, as with VaR estimates.   
 
Simulation with data for 1975-2004 period results in higher VaR and ETL estimates for balanced 
strategies compared to the more aggressive strategies.  Generally, VaR and ETL estimates seem to 
gradually deteriorate with increasing stock allocation.  This is quite the opposite of our results using 
1900-2004 data but the range of VaR estimates is still very narrow.  The lowest estimate of 4.3970 is 
given by the 100 per cent stocks strategy, which means that the participants who invest in this strategy 
have a 5 per cent chance of accumulating wealth that is less than 4.39 times their final annual salary.  
The highest estimate of 5.4205 is produced by lifecycle strategy #18 which invests two-thirds in stocks 
for participants below 60 years and one-third thereafter.  By adopting this strategy, participants would 
have a 5 per cent chance of having their plan account balance at retirement less than 5.42 times their 
final annual salary.  It is easy to see that the gap between these two situations can hardly be considered 
as the difference between a ruinous and a non-ruinous outcome.  This is confirmed by the ETL estimates 
which range from 3.2636 to 4.5456 indicating even the below 5 per cent outcomes are not very different 
between different allocation strategies.  Thus our evidence clearly implies that the risk of confronting 
extremely poor retirement wealth outcomes may not be very sensitive to the choice of asset allocation 
strategy.  
 
The evidence on the most adverse outcomes for lifecycle strategies and their corresponding fixed weight 
strategies is mixed.  While simulations using data for the full period and the post-war period result in 
lower VaR estimates for lifecycle strategies compared to corresponding fixed weight strategies, the 
results are quite the opposite for simulations based on the most recent 30 year period (1975-2004) when 
all three lifecycle strategies are found to slightly improve the VaR estimates.  The ETL estimates also 
follow the same pattern except for simulations with post war data where two of the three lifecycle 
strategies produce higher estimates than their corresponding fixed weight strategies.  Based on this 
evidence, the claim of lifecycle strategies reducing the risk of most unfavourable outcomes does not 
appear to be strong.  Even in cases where they reduce the severity of the extreme outcomes, the benefits 
appear to be marginal. 
 
 26
 V. Conclusion 
 
Given the fact that Australian stocks have significantly outperformed fixed income securities over long 
horizons in the past, it is no surprise that differences between default investment options with respect to 
their exposure to stocks result in large differences in simulated terminal wealth outcomes for DC plan 
participants.  More revealing is our finding that very high allocations to stocks may actually prove to be 
less risky on most occasions if risk is viewed in the context of falling short of the participant’s wealth 
accumulation target, in terms of both probability and magnitude of shortfall.   
 
At present, regulators in most countries, including Australia, do not prescribe any asset allocation 
structure for default investment options.  But very often they emphasise the importance of 
diversification in coping with risk by optimizing its trade-off with returns.  Our results, however, raise 
serious questions about the benefits of diversification for very long term investors like DC plan 
participants, who seem to have higher likelihood of being better off by concentrating their investments 
in stocks alone.  We have demonstrated that the strategies that are heavily tilted towards stocks not only 
reduce the chance of failure in meeting the participants’ wealth accumulation target but also seem to 
diminish the extent of shortfall in case the participants fail to achieve such objective.  At the same time, 
they seem to offer strong upside potential of generating terminal wealth outcomes that outperform the 
participant's accumulation target at retirement.  
 
Perhaps the most powerful evidence against selecting balanced diversified strategies or even moderately 
aggressive strategies as default options is provided by our results for tail-related risk.  As stock returns 
are essentially considered to be more volatile than other asset class returns, one would have normally 
expected their presence in the portfolio to cause more extreme outcomes.  However, our results indicate 
that the extreme wealth outcomes occur mostly at the upper tail of the wealth distribution, which is 
actually favourable to the plan participant.  The measures for the extreme outcomes at the lower tail of 
retirement wealth distribution suggest that higher allocation to stocks do not necessarily increase the risk 
of confronting these adverse outcomes and in some cases, may even reduce their severity.  In our study, 
the risk of extremely adverse outcome does not seem to vary considerably with change of asset 
allocation which implies that extreme loss aversion should have minimal role to play in asset allocation 
decision for default investment options. 
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 Trustees using conservative or balanced diversified strategies as defaults may argue that these strategies 
tend to reduce the variability of outcomes and therefore can potentially minimize the problems 
associated with disparity in wealth accumulated by different employee cohorts.  But selection of defaults 
primarily on this criterion can be deemed as flawed given that the trade-off involves much lower 
accumulation of retirement wealth and therefore, defeats the very purpose of instituting these plans.  By 
nominating such ‘safe’ strategies as defaults, plan providers may actually be instrumental in creating 
future generations of retirees who are ‘more equal’ but ‘poorer’ instead of retiree cohorts who are ‘less 
equal’ but nevertheless ‘wealthier’.  This is also the case with the lifecycle strategies considered in our 
study which reduce the variability of wealth outcomes but at the cost of producing much lower 
retirement wealth than what the participants could potentially achieve by not switching to a relatively 
conservative allocation rule as they near retirement.  
 
Shiller (2003) opines that merely defining and implementing the default option correctly for individual 
accounts within social security can prove to be the most effective tool for intervention.  It appears that 
the same also applies to individual accounts in DC plans.  This paper strongly suggests the possibility of 
widely different wealth outcomes confronting many DC plan participants simply as a result of the 
existing disparity in asset allocation structure between their plans' default investment options. It 
demonstrates that the balanced diversified strategies nominated by many plan providers in Australia as 
default investment options may not be well suited to optimise the retirement benefits of the participants.  
The problem may be even more serious for countries like the US, where DC plans typically adopt an 
even more conservative approach towards asset allocation.   
 
Two issues related to our study deserve further attention. First, our results, undoubtedly, have been 
influenced by the large premium that Australian stocks have enjoyed historically over bonds and bills.  
By using long term return data for asset classes over a hundred years, we have attempted to ensure that 
our results are not biased by returns for any asset class in a particularly favourable (or unfavourable) 
period.  Yet, as many commentators have observed, even a century long dataset may be inadequate to 
predict the entire gamut of future possibilities. Analysing the impact of potential fall in real equity 
premium in future on the appropriateness of default investment choice in DC plans can be an area which 
future research would do well to investigate. Second, our investigation has been limited to static asset 
allocation strategies that are currently favoured by DC plan providers. However, to consider the 
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optimality of a strategy among all available options, it is essential to consider a range of dynamic 
allocation strategies from those which would alter portfolio weights in response to time varying equity 
premium to ones which would allocate dynamically based on accumulation of retirement assets at any 
point relative to a set target.  
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Table I: Asset Allocation of Default Investment Options 
 
 Stocks (%) Bonds (%) Cash (%) 
FIXED WEIGHT STRATEGIES    
1. UniSuper Balanced 64 36 0 
2. Equipsuper Balanced Growth 65 30 5 
3. HOSTPlus Balanced 66 32 2 
4. Sunsuper Balanced 66 32 2 
5. REST Core 66 24 10 
6. Telstra Balanced* 67 33 0 
7. First State Super Diversified# 68 17 15 
8. CARE Super Balanced 69 26 5 
9. Westcheme Trustee's Selection 73 27 0 
10. Vision Balanced Growth 74 23 3 
11. HESTA Core Pool 77 21 2 
12. NGS Diversified 79 18 3 
13. ARF Balanced 80 18 2 
14. STA Balanced 83 15 2 
15. Cbus Super 83 14 3 
16. Health Long Term Growth^ 88 12 0 
17. MTAA 93 4 3 
LIFECYCLE STRATEGIES    
18. Telstra:    
   Under 60 years (Balanced) 67 33 0 
   60 years and above (Conservative) 32 48 20 
19. First State Super:    
   Up to 56 years (Diversified) 68 17 15 
   Above 56 years (Balanced) 47 28 25 
20. Health:    
   Less than 50 years (Long Term Grow.) 88 12 0 
   50 to 60 years (Medium Term Growth) 64 36 0 
   Above 60 years (Balanced) 41 59 0 
HYPOTHETICAL STRATEGIES    
21. Default Option Average 67 26 7 
22. 100% Stock 100 0 0 
 
* Initial allocation of lifecycle strategy #18; # Initial allocation of lifecycle strategy #19; ^ Initial allocation of lifecycle 
strategy #20 
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Table II: Distribution Parameters of Retirement Wealth Ratio (RWR) 
Table II reports the distribution of RWR from the Monte Carlo simulation (multivariate normal).  A total of 5,000 iterations for every asset 
allocation strategy under consideration to generate different investment return paths over 40-year periods.  Max., Min., Q1, and Q3 denote 
maximum, minimum, first quartile, and third quartile RWR outcomes respectively.  CV and IQRR measure the dispersion of RWR 
outcomes and stands for coefficient of variation and interquartile range ratio for the distribution of RWR outcomes respectively. 
 
PANEL A: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1900-2004 DATA 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Q1 Q3 CV IQRR 
FIXED WEIGHT STRATEGIES         
1. UniSuper Balanced 9.73 8.21 75.73 1.19 5.70 12.05 0.62 0.77 
2. Equipsuper Bal. Growth 9.61 8.16 82.63 1.46 5.69 11.90 0.60 0.76 
3. HOSTPlus Balanced 9.85 8.24 73.28 1.44 5.72 12.10 0.64 0.77 
4. Sunsuper Balanced 9.98 8.33 99.95 1.50 5.84 12.34 0.63 0.78 
5. REST Core 9.56 8.17 74.64 1.56 5.70 11.70 0.60 0.73 
6. Telstra Balanced  10.06 8.54 82.95 1.44 5.83 12.36 0.65 0.76 
7. First State Super Div.  9.70 8.33 66.52 1.17 5.82 12.05 0.59 0.75 
8. CARE Super Balanced 10.43 8.77 93.14 1.25 6.06 12.84 0.64 0.77 
9. Westscheme Trustee's Sel. 11.32 9.19 98.41 1.27 6.18 14.15 0.69 0.87 
10. Vision Balanced Growth 11.12 9.14 67.29 1.33 6.20 14.02 0.65 0.86 
11. HESTA Core Pool 11.83 9.61 89.89 1.26 6.38 14.72 0.69 0.87 
12. NGS Diversified 12.24 10.03 115.97 1.19 6.58 15.13 0.72 0.85 
13. ARF Balanced  12.54 10.17 153.85 1.32 6.55 15.58 0.72 0.89 
14. STA Balanced 13.24 10.50 133.49 1.31 6.76 16.22 0.77 0.90 
15. Cbus Super 13.16 10.57 114.17 1.47 7.00 16.37 0.73 0.89 
16. Health Long Term Growth  14.31 11.24 136.11 1.28 7.12 17.71 0.74 0.94 
17. MTAA 15.28 12.07 108.19 1.50 7.49 19.03 0.78 0.96 
LIFECYCLE STRATEGIES         
18. Telstra 9.02 7.78 49.18 1.56 5.46 11.12 0.58 0.73 
19. First State Super 8.64 7.56 47.90 1.31 5.40 10.66 0.54 0.70 
20. Health 9.47 8.12 65.26 1.49 5.66 11.54 0.61 0.72 
HYPOTHETICAL STRATEGIES         
21. Default Option Average 9.90 8.37 72.27 1.69 5.84 12.34 0.62 0.78 
22. 100% Stock 17.37 12.88 194.55 1.13 7.78 21.48 0.90 1.06 
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Table II (cont’d): Distribution Parameters of Retirement Wealth Ratio (RWR) 
 
PANEL B: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1947-2004 DATA 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Q1 Q3 CV IQRR 
FIXED WEIGHT STRATEGIES         
         
1. UniSuper Balanced 7.53 6.11 122.60 1.14 4.13 9.19 0.74 0.83 
2. Equipsuper Bal. Growth 7.53 6.14 56.56 0.77 4.17 9.30 0.68 0.84 
3. HOSTPlus Balanced 7.75 6.32 70.14 0.90 4.14 9.52 0.71 0.85 
4. Sunsuper Balanced 7.73 6.28 114.36 0.90 4.17 9.55 0.73 0.86 
5. REST Core 7.80 6.45 47.83 1.02 4.30 9.66 0.67 0.83 
6. Telstra Balanced 7.83 6.33 73.43 0.97 4.20 9.59 0.73 0.85 
7. First State Super Div.  7.88 6.45 67.46 0.88 4.34 9.67 0.69 0.82 
8. CARE Super Balanced 8.01 6.45 66.90 0.88 4.30 9.77 0.72 0.85 
9. Westscheme Trustee's Sel. 8.90 6.90 77.26 0.97 4.53 11.05 0.79 0.95 
10. Vision Balanced Growth 8.86 6.86 159.40 0.98 4.52 10.94 0.83 0.94 
11. HESTA Core Pool 9.15 7.11 87.00 0.75 4.45 11.45 0.81 0.98 
12. NGS Diversified 9.43 7.06 82.73 0.90 4.53 11.81 0.82 1.03 
13. ARF Balanced  9.47 7.25 87.65 0.94 4.58 11.50 0.84 0.95 
14. STA Balanced 10.58 7.57 269.15 0.87 4.76 12.69 1.08 1.05 
15. Cbus Super 10.49 7.71 210.27 0.76 4.69 12.78 0.93 1.05 
16. Health Long Term Growth  11.26 8.14 167.64 0.58 4.83 13.72 0.96 1.09 
17. MTAA 12.01 8.38 165.10 0.57 4.90 14.64 0.99 1.16 
LIFECYCLE STRATEGIES         
18. Telstra 6.92 5.78 60.38 0.79 4.01 8.53 0.63 0.78 
19. First State Super 7.03 5.87 59.13 1.15 4.07 8.53 0.65 0.76 
20. Health 7.44 6.07 47.68 0.88 4.13 9.15 0.68 0.83 
HYPOTHETICAL STRATEGIES         
21. Default Option Average 7.77 6.31 87.21 0.99 4.29 9.49 0.71 0.82 
22. 100% Stock 13.63 8.92 228.03 0.76 5.11 16.54 1.14 1.28 
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Table II (cont’d): Distribution Parameters of Retirement Wealth Ratio (RWR) 
 
PANEL C: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1975-2004 DATA 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Q1 Q3 CV IQRR 
FIXED WEIGHT STRATEGIES         
         
1. UniSuper Balanced 15.99 13.29 115.88 1.41 8.88 19.85 0.68 0.83 
2. Equipsuper Bal. Growth 16.21 13.36 135.89 1.82 9.05 19.80 0.68 0.80 
3. HOSTPlus Balanced 16.82 13.64 131.48 1.90 9.24 20.75 0.69 0.84 
4. Sunsuper Balanced 16.88 13.90 154.42 1.90 9.26 21.21 0.69 0.86 
5. REST Core 15.81 13.15 149.30 2.25 8.91 19.76 0.66 0.82 
6. Telstra Balanced 16.57 13.69 173.81 1.87 9.08 20.54 0.69 0.84 
7. First State Super Div. 15.92 13.24 161.27 1.61 8.87 19.88 0.66 0.83 
8. CARE Super Balanced 17.18 13.75 147.68 1.69 9.04 21.70 0.73 0.92 
9. Westscheme Trustee's Sel. 18.52 14.55 148.00 1.74 9.52 22.77 0.76 0.91 
10. Vision Balanced Growth 18.81 14.96 197.04 1.44 9.51 23.22 0.77 0.92 
11. HESTA Core Pool 19.49 15.05 223.53 1.31 9.61 23.93 0.84 0.95 
12. NGS Diversified 20.33 15.79 430.06 1.42 9.76 25.42 0.85 0.99 
13. ARF Balanced 20.47 15.64 331.79 1.39 9.73 25.57 0.86 1.01 
14. STA Balanced 21.31 15.96 278.44 1.70 9.94 26.65 0.85 1.05 
15. Cbus Super 21.91 16.03 276.49 1.47 9.89 26.91 0.90 1.06 
16. Health Long Term Growth 23.67 17.11 375.28 1.01 9.97 29.19 0.95 1.12 
17. MTAA 24.88 17.34 471.52 0.98 9.95 30.50 1.04 1.18 
LIFECYCLE STRATEGIES         
18. Telstra 15.16 12.67 107.95 1.75 8.70 18.76 0.63 0.79 
19. First State Super 14.64 12.45 146.95 2.27 8.71 17.83 0.63 0.73 
20. Health 16.01 13.29 136.60 2.07 8.99 19.67 0.91 0.80 
HYPOTHETICAL STRATEGIES         
21. Default Option Average 16.32 13.42 130.57 1.71 8.97 20.40 0.68 0.85 
22. 100% Stock 28.15 18.17 460.72 1.34 9.78 33.45 1.19 1.30 
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Table III: Estimates for Downside Risk and Performance Measures 
Table III reports estimates for downside risk and performance measures from the Monte Carlo simulation.  , , and 
measure downside risk and represent lower partial moment with degree
OLPM 1LPM
2LPM )(λ  0, 1, and 2 respectively.  The downside risk adjusted 
performance measures SR and UPR denote Sortino ratio and upside potential ratio respectively.  A target retirement wealth ratio ( ) 
of 8.0 has been used in the simulations to estimate these measures. 
TRWR
 
PANEL A: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1900-2004 DATA 
 0LPM  1LPM  2LPM  SR  UPR  
FIXED WEIGHT STRATEGIES      
1. UniSuper Balanced 0.4826 1.2058 4.1128 0.8544 1.4490 
2. Equipsuper Balanced Growth 0.4864 1.1960 4.0210 0.8014 1.3978 
3. HOSTPlus Balanced 0.4812 1.1992 4.0933 0.9149 1.5076 
4. Sunsuper Balanced 0.4708 1.1609 3.9432 0.9979 1.5825 
5. REST Core 0.4858 1.1813 3.9251 0.7862 1.3825 
6. Telstra Balanced (Under 60) 0.4580 1.1329 3.8144 1.0571 1.6371 
7. First State Super Div. (Up to 56) 0.4722 1.1514 3.8447 0.8673 1.4544 
8. CARE Super Balanced 0.4384 1.0589 3.5243 1.2927 1.8567 
9. Westscheme Trustee's Selection 0.4094 0.9874 3.2778 1.8359 2.3812 
10. Vision Balanced Growth 0.4108 1.0025 3.4088 1.6925 2.2355 
11. HESTA Core Pool 0.3858 0.9287 3.1060 2.1707 2.6977 
12. NGS Diversified 0.3620 0.8855 3.0256 2.4365 2.9456 
13. ARF Balanced 0.3554 0.8721 2.9170 2.6610 3.1716 
14. STA Balanced 0.3408 0.8280 2.8008 3.1317 3.6264 
15. Cbus Super 0.3302 0.7711 2.6087 3.1931 3.6705 
16. Health LT Growth (Less than 50) 0.3132 0.7531 2.5702 3.9329 4.4027 
17. MTAA 0.2806 0.6820 2.3084 4.7946 5.2435 
LIFECYCLE STRATEGIES      
18. Telstra 0.5194 1.3100 4.4336 0.4855 1.1076 
19. First State Super 0.5438 1.3565 4.5678 0.3001 0.9348 
20. Health 0.4868 1.2202 4.196 0.7189 1.3146 
HYPOTHETICAL STRATEGIES      
21. Default Option Average 0.4696 1.1455 3.8546 0.9681 1.5516 
22. 100% Stock 0.2622 0.6415 2.2062 6.3074 6.7393 
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Table III (cont’d): Estimates for Downside Risk and Performance Measures 
 
PANEL B: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1947-2004 DATA 
 0LPM  1LPM  2LPM  SR  UPR  
FIXED WEIGHT STRATEGIES      
1. UniSuper Balanced 0.6758 2.1418 8.6593 -0.1588 0.5690 
2. Equipsuper Balanced Growth 0.6708 2.1008 8.3474 -0.1627 0.5644 
3. HOSTPlus Balanced 0.6500 2.0645 8.4223 -0.0869 0.6244 
4. Sunsuper Balanced 0.6520 2.0616 8.3608 -0.0927 0.6203 
5. REST Core 0.6422 1.9866 7.9223 -0.0719 0.6339 
6. Telstra Balanced (Under 60) 0.6508 2.0519 8.2799 -0.0606 0.6525 
7. First State Super Div. (Up to 56) 0.6404 1.9645 7.8222 -0.0420 0.6604 
8. CARE Super Balanced 0.6342 1.9842 7.9524 0.0034 0.7070 
9. Westscheme Trustee's Selection 0.5854 1.8215 7.3011 0.3321 1.0062 
10. Vision Balanced Growth 0.5904 1.8280 7.3254 0.3192 0.9946 
11. HESTA Core Pool 0.5688 1.7991 7.3513 0.4231 1.0867 
12. NGS Diversified 0.5644 1.7707 7.1433 0.5332 1.1957 
13. ARF Balanced 0.5610 1.7444 7.1135 0.5523 1.2063 
14. STA Balanced 0.5328 1.6290 6.5471 1.0092 1.6458 
15. Cbus Super 0.5236 1.6430 6.7266 0.9618 1.5953 
16. Health LT Growth (Less than 50) 0.4936 1.5611 6.4333 1.2868 1.9023 
17. MTAA 0.4786 1.5407 6.5718 1.5652 2.1662 
LIFECYCLE STRATEGIES      
18. Telstra 0.7112 2.2890 9.2494 -0.3543 0.3983 
19. First State Super 0.7160 2.2379 8.8958 -0.3265 0.4239 
20. Health 0.6768 2.1413 8.6017 -0.1900 0.5401 
HYPOTHETICAL STRATEGIES      
21. Default Option Average 0.6512 2.0240 8.0674 -0.0794 0.6333 
22. 100% Stock 0.4494 1.4613 6.2095 2.2612 2.8477 
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Table III (cont’d): Estimates for Downside Risk and Performance Measures 
 
PANEL C: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1975-2004 DATA 
 0LPM  1LPM  2LPM  SR  UPR  
FIXED WEIGHT STRATEGIES      
1. UniSuper Balanced 0.1976 0.4018 1.1840 7.3444 7.7136 
2. Equipsuper Balanced Growth 0.1846 0.3588 1.0403 8.0477 8.3995 
3. HOSTPlus Balanced 0.1838 0.3705 1.0869 8.4585 8.8138 
4. Sunsuper Balanced 0.1788 0.3502 1.0037 8.8621 9.2116 
5. REST Core 0.1948 0.3725 1.0416 7.6533 8.0183 
6. Telstra Balanced (Under 60) 0.1890 0.3810 1.1402 8.0291 8.3859 
7. First State Super Div. (Up to 56) 0.1982 0.3824 1.1074 7.523 7.8864 
8. CARE Super Balanced 0.1868 0.373 1.1027 8.7461 9.1013 
9. Westscheme Trustee's Selection 0.1782 0.3543 1.0350 10.3392 10.6874 
10. Vision Balanced Growth 0.1738 0.3691 1.1365 10.1426 10.4888 
11. HESTA Core Pool 0.1768 0.3871 1.2170 10.419 10.7699 
12. NGS Diversified 0.1734 0.3799 1.2054 11.2307 11.5767 
13. ARF Balanced 0.1694 0.3691 1.1599 11.5822 11.9249 
14. STA Balanced 0.1626 0.3547 1.1071 12.6542 12.9913 
15. Cbus Super 0.1700 0.3774 1.2588 12.3981 12.7345 
16. Health LT Growth (Less than 50) 0.1680 0.3949 1.3534 13.4668 13.8062 
17. MTAA 0.1742 0.4319 1.5029 13.7728 14.1251 
LIFECYCLE STRATEGIES      
18. Telstra 0.2038 0.3566 0.9211 7.4590 7.8306 
19. First State Super 0.2014 0.3639 0.9836 6.6922 7.0592 
20. Health 0.1876 0.3591 1.0184 7.9387 8.2945 
HYPOTHETICAL STRATEGIES      
21. Default Option Average 0.1868 0.3744 1.1073 7.9102 8.2659 
22. 100% Stock 0.1812 0.4641 1.6793 15.551 15.9092 
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Table IV: Tail Risk Estimates for RWR Distribution 
Table IV reports tail risk estimates for the RWR Distribution from the Monte Carlo simulation.  Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected Tail 
Loss (ETL) for RWR outcomes are estimated at 95% confidence level.  Therefore, there is a 5% probability of the RWR falling below the 
VaR estimate.  Conditional to the RWR falling below VaR i.e. for the worst 5% of RWR outcomes, the expected value is given by ETL. 
 
PANEL A: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1900-2004 DATA 
 VaR ETL 
FIXED WEIGHT STRATEGIES   
1. UniSuper Balanced 3.3936 2.8416 
2. Equipsuper Balanced Growth 3.4528 2.8546 
3. HOSTPlus Balanced 3.3961 2.7940 
4. Sunsuper Balanced 3.4546 2.8623 
5. REST Core 3.5509 2.9596 
6. Telstra Balanced (Under 60) 3.5407 2.8946 
7. First State Super Diversified (Up to 56) 3.5439 2.9209 
8. CARE Super Balanced 3.6079 2.9467 
9. Westscheme Trustee's Selection 3.6781 3.0074 
10. Vision Balanced Growth 3.6085 2.9194 
11. HESTA Core Pool 3.7601 3.0432 
12. NGS Diversified 3.6860 2.9813 
13. ARF Balanced 3.8085 3.0626 
14. STA Balanced 3.8493 3.0136 
15. Cbus Super 3.8785 3.0489 
16. Health Long Term Growth (Less than 50) 3.8527 3.0394 
17. MTAA 3.9685 3.2016 
LIFECYCLE STRATEGIES   
18. Telstra 3.3876 2.8527 
19. First State Super 3.3596 2.8547 
20. Health 3.4053 2.7809 
HYPOTHETICAL STRATEGIES   
21. Default Option Average 3.4616 2.8893 
22. 100% Stock 4.0033 3.2043 
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Table IV (cont’d): Tail Risk Estimates for RWR Distribution 
 
PANEL B: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1947-2004 DATA 
 VaR ETL 
FIXED WEIGHT STRATEGIES   
1. UniSuper Balanced 2.4104 1.9786 
2. Equipsuper Balanced Growth 2.5638 2.0846 
3. HOSTPlus Balanced 2.4318 1.9809 
4. Sunsuper Balanced 2.4679 2.0144 
5. REST Core 2.5063 2.0462 
6. Telstra Balanced (Under 60) 2.4900 2.0005 
7. First State Super Diversified (Up to 56) 2.5059 2.0445 
8. CARE Super Balanced 2.4761 2.0495 
9. Westscheme Trustee's Selection 2.5348 2.0462 
10. Vision Balanced Growth 2.4820 2.022 
11. HESTA Core Pool 2.4687 1.9800 
12. NGS Diversified 2.5171 2.0443 
13. ARF Balanced 2.4241 1.9788 
14. STA Balanced 2.6014 2.0458 
15. Cbus Super 2.5400 1.9845 
16. Health Long Term Growth (Less than 50) 2.5301 1.9845 
17. MTAA 2.3603 1.7973 
LIFECYCLE STRATEGIES   
18. Telstra 2.4083 2.0388 
19. First State Super 2.4798 2.1051 
20. Health 2.4494 1.973 
HYPOTHETICAL STRATEGIES   
21. Default Option Average 2.5196 2.028 
22. 100% Stock 2.4100 1.8323 
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Table IV (cont’d): Tail Risk Estimates for RWR Distribution 
 
PANEL C: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1975-2004 DATA 
 VaR ETL 
FIXED WEIGHT STRATEGIES   
1. UniSuper Balanced 5.0125 4.1038 
2. Equipsuper Balanced Growth 5.2719 4.2175 
3. HOSTPlus Balanced 5.1698 4.1914 
4. Sunsuper Balanced 5.2555 4.2777 
5. REST Core 5.2100 4.3105 
6. Telstra Balanced (Under 60) 5.0357 4.0709 
7. First State Super Diversified (Up to 56) 5.1787 4.1742 
8. CARE Super Balanced 5.1950 4.1339 
9. Westscheme Trustee's Selection 5.1885 4.2363 
10. Vision Balanced Growth 5.1203 4.0174 
11. HESTA Core Pool 4.9902 3.9311 
12. NGS Diversified 4.9661 3.9327 
13. ARF Balanced 5.1072 3.9737 
14. STA Balanced 5.0853 4.0408 
15. Cbus Super 4.8199 3.7760 
16. Health Long Term Growth (Less than 50) 4.8043 3.6031 
17. MTAA 4.6138 3.512 
LIFECYCLE STRATEGIES   
18. Telstra 5.4205 4.5456 
19. First State Super 5.2575 4.3972 
20. Health 5.2157 4.3255 
HYPOTHETICAL STRATEGIES   
21. Default Option Average 5.1974 4.1088 
22. 100% Stock 4.3970 3.2636 
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APPENDIX A: Descriptive Statistics of Historical Annual Return Data 
 
 
1. 1900-2004 data
 
 Stocks Bonds Bills 
  
Mean 0.090952 0.022667 0.007238
Median 0.110000 0.020000 0.010000
Maximum 0.510000 0.620000 0.180000
Minimum -0.380000 -0.270000 -0.160000
Standard Deviation 0.177426 0.133627 0.055131
Skewness -0.247029 0.663710 -0.058101
Kurtosis 2.972500 6.086779 4.319608
Observations 105 105 105 
 
 
 
2. 1947-2004 data
 
 Stocks Bonds Bills 
    
 Mean  0.080517  0.010862  0.006207
 Median  0.105000  0.020000  0.015000
 Maximum  0.510000  0.270000  0.090000
 Minimum -0.380000 -0.270000 -0.160000
 Standard Deviation  0.210642  0.114682  0.050881
 Skewness -0.140441 -0.464026 -0.988497
 Kurtosis  2.416410  3.133224  4.467748
 Observations  58  58  58 
 
 
 
 
3. 1975-2004 data
 
 Stocks Bonds Bills 
    
 Mean  0.109333  0.049667  0.032000
 Median  0.115000  0.090000  0.030000
 Maximum  0.510000  0.270000  0.090000
 Minimum -0.230000 -0.190000 -0.060000
 Standard Deviation  0.205358  0.111308  0.037637
 Skewness  0.084032 -0.414026 -0.588575
 Kurtosis  2.081935  2.546260  3.133234
 Observations  30  30  30 
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APPENDIX B: Correlation Matrices 
 
 
1. 1900-2004 data
 
 Stocks Bonds Bills 
 
Stocks 
 
 
1.0000 
 
0.3389 
 
0.2524 
Bonds 0.3389 1.0000 0.6344 
 
Bills 
 
0.2524 
 
0.6344 
 
1.0000 
 
 
 
2. 1947-2004 data
 
 Stocks Bonds Bills 
 
Stocks 
 
 
1.0000 
 
0.3237 
 
 
0.2113 
 
Bonds 0.3237 
 
1.0000 0.6406 
 
Bills 0.2113 
 
0.6406 1.0000 
 
 
 
3. 1975-2004 data
 
 Stocks Bonds Bills 
 
Stocks 
 
 
1.0000 
 
0.0542 
 
-0.0671 
Bonds 0.0542 1.0000 0.4207 
 
Bills 
 
-0.0671 
 
0.4207 
 
1.0000 
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